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## White House war over the summit

AS President Reagan prepares for his first summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, he is confronted with a deeply divided staff.

They are giving him conflicting advice on strategy, goals and how to handle his energetic younger opponent in their November showdown in Geneva.

The debate over the summit inside the administration is the climax of a four-year controversy over U.S. arms control and defense.

It pits hardliners in the Defense Dept. and the White House against the more moderate and accomodating foreign-policy establishment of the State Dept.

At the center of the raging summit debate is the fundamental question of what Gorbachev's intentions are as he comes out from behind the Iron Curtain into the spotlight with Reagan for the first time.

Moderates, led by Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, are taking the view that the Soviet leadership, after four years of paralysis, is finally ready to have a real foreign policy.

They believe that Gorbachev is looking toward the summit as a return to U.S.-Soviet relations during the detente of the 1970s — mostly to reap the benefits of the thaw.

Those benefits, including open trade, exchanges of technology and increased agricultural aid, will enable him to begin easing the Soviet Union's enormous economic and farming problems.

At the same time, Shultz and the moderate wing also believe, as do the conservatives, that Gorbachev is looking to use the summit as the way to kill Reagan's Star Wars defense project and gain an agreement that would force the U.S. and NATO to limit medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

With these goals in mind, State Dept. sees a "window of opportunity" for Reagan to use Star Wars and free trade as leverage in getting an arms control agreement that would erase the Soviet Union's 3 to 1 edge with the nuclear warheads, as well as set an agenda that would lead to future Soviet concessions on human rights and "regional issues" like Afghanstan and Nicaragua.

In short, the administration's diplomats are pushing Reagan to enter into a time of compromise and peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.

Conservatives. led by Defense Sec. Caspar Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey and top White House aide Pat Buchanan, have a far different view of what Gorbachev is hoping to accomplish at the summit.

These officials see the meeting as a confronta-

tion with Gorbachev and are coaching Reagan to approach it on a "win or lose" basis.

The conservatives believe that Gorbachev is using the summit as part of an all-out offensive to embarrass Reagan and to improve his own image in America and Europe in an attempt to secure his nation's strategic advantage at the expense of Star Wars.

While Shultz, McFarlane and other moderates see Gorbachev as a new breed of Soviet leader bent on improving relations with the West to further his own interests, the Weinberger group sees him as just another product of a Soviet system that is an enemy of its own people.

These officials also take the strong view that no arms control agreement with the Soviet Union is worth giving up Star Wars—which they see as America's only way to avoid nuclear blackmail by the Soviet Union in the future.

President Reagan's own views on the summit are not clearly known at this point, but insiders believe that he probably falls somewhere in between the two divergent views of his advisers.

On the one hand, it is well-known that Reagan has undergone a transformation in his 4½ years in office and that he established as his No. 1 priority for the history books the successful negotiation of a meaningful arms control accord.

On the other hand, Reagan has made a career out of taking on the Kremlin. He undoubtedly will be highly suspicious of Gorbachev and will not let himself be pushed around in his nine-hour talks.

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